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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

This publication provides a periodic review of internal security in underdeveloped countries where there is a threat from Communist-supported insurgency.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Current Intelligence

DIA review(s) completed.

State Department review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 21 July 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Review of Insurgency Problems

1. Laos

Rightist regular and guerrilla forces have launched a drive against Communist positions in northeast Laos. Elements of six battalions

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have registered have registered to retake Hua Muong, a key hill position on Route 6 between Ban Ban and Samneua which had been lost to the Communists last winter. Recent reports indicate that the Communists are bringing up reinforcements to counter the rightist drive.

Activity in other areas remains relatively light. The army commanders are apparently waiting for the political dust to settle following the recent National Assembly elections before committing their forces to new initiatives.

2. Sudan

The security situation in the Sudan's three Negroid southern provinces is still deteriorating, with no end in sight to the conflict there. The rebels have now begun a more aggressive campaign and last week attacked security forces in both Juba and Wau, the political capitals of Equatoria and Bahr el-Ghazal provinces.

The political moves initiated by the transitional government in Khartoum last fall to negotiate some peaceful constitutional settlement with the separatist-minded southerners have now been almost completely abandoned, and the government has reverted

to a purely military effort. Rebel capabilities, however, have vastly increased in the past six months. They have taken large quantities of modern weapons from Congolese rebels in the border areas and control most of the southern provinces outside of major garrison towns. Bridges on major roads have been destroyed, and the army is now becoming dependent on air supply routes to many garrisons. The rainy season, just beginning, will further hamper any offensive action by the army, and attacks on urban areas will probably continue.

In Khartoum, southern leaders quickly protested the brutal reprisals taken against southern civilians after a clash in Juba last week. The government—which has consistently minimized casualty figures from the south—responded by closing the Khartoum southern newspaper Vigilant, and special security measures have been invoked to protect government installations in the Khartoum area against possible southern sabotage attempts.

The army is also still saddled with the problem of handling the Congolese rebels who have taken refuge in the southern border area. Several thousand Congolese are reportedly still encamped under the supervision of Sudanese Army units. The presence of the Congolese rebels in the Sudan has already encouraged Tshombé to cooperate with the Sudanese insurgents, who are now said to be assisting Congolese Army forces in reconnaissance and patrol missions along the border.

3. Congo

Most of the Congo is relatively quiet, and the government has successfully withstood recent rebel aggressions in the Fizi area. Following heavy attacks last week in the area north of Albertville, rebel activity now is declining, probably as a result of punishing air attacks. Congolese Army (ANC) posts between Albertville and Fizi continue to report sporadic fighting, however. West of Fizi, ANC garrisons are continuing their successful clearing operations against faltering rebel resistance.

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In the northeast, mercenary units continue to clear the major roads and are expanding government control outside the larger towns. A train traveling west from Paulis was sabotaged last week and remains disabled 30 miles south of the town. Commercial traffic now is possible through much of the extreme northeast, however, and resumption of train service would stimulate the economic recovery of this vast region.

sizable rebel bands remain in the territory west

of Bunia, south of Watsa, and east of Paulis.

The border areas remain quiet, although

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Southern Sudanese dissidents,

continue to harass and occupy

the attention of the Sudanese military.

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4. Mozambique

The naval commander of Mozambique, Rear Admiral Carlos Oliveira, has confirmed that rebel activity in the north, particularly in the north-west, is increasing. He admitted to the US consul that some 50 Portuguese soldiers have been killed since the initial outbreak of trouble last September; the highest estimate given previously had been about 23. He added that existing Portuguese forces could easily contain insurgent activity, barring massive rebel reinforcements or a substantial increase in outside assistance.

Oliveira estimated that rebels in the northwest number as many as 400, and said that they are reported to be aggressive, well trained, and competent in the use of firearms. He stated that the region is practically devoid of population except for rebels and Portuguese.

Previous reports had indicated a substantial flow of refugees from the northwest to Likoma Island, a Malawian island in Lake Nyasa off the coast of Mozambique. The US military attaché in Blantyre reported that there were 2,000 Mozambican refugees on the island, most of whom had fled because of increasing rebel and Portuguese military activities, and because they were unwilling to be resettled in "safe haven" villages by the Portuguese authorities.

Oliveira said that military convoys move freely through infiltrated areas in the northwest, but that they are subject to ambush at any time by elusive rebels, who quickly disappear into the tall grass covering the area. Many of the insurgents come down Lake Nyasa from Tanzania in small boats which are extremely difficult to intercept because the noisy Portuguese patrol boats give them plenty of advance warning. The government plans to increase patrolling activities, and also hopes to burn down the tall grass when the rainy season ends shortly.

The naval commander's unusually frank discussion of Portuguese problems in Mozambique confirms previous reports that the situation is not as well under control as officials have publicly indicated. The government has been particularly reluctant to admit the upsurge of insurgency in the northwest, probably to avoid panic among the white Mozambicans. There is no reason to believe that Portuguese military forces are seriously threatened, but the government is undoubtedly concerned at the prospect of a long siege of insurgent activity.

5. Colombia

Isolated incidents continue in the countryside and in small towns throughout Colombia, but no pattern of centrally directed guerrilla action is yet apparent.

Three soldiers were killed near Marquetalia, presumably by members of the Communist-directed gang of Tiro Fijo. Shortly thereafter, in a series of separate search-and-seizure actions, army patrols killed five of Tiro Fijo's sublicutements, including the notorious Gallina Ciega.

In Bucaramanga, two unidentified men entered the hospital room where Communist bandit Florencio Amaya (Chato) was recovering from wounds inflicted during his capture and stabbed him to death. At almost exactly the time of Chato's murder, according to the press, an unidentified voice broadcast news of his death over the local radio station, "in the name of the National Army of Liberation" (ELN). Colombian authorities believe Chato may have been murdered by his fellow Communists to prevent his divulging information about the ELN and that the broadcast was intended to intimidate other would-be informers.

In an official announcement to the press, Minister of War Rebeiz said that 46 of the 54 bandit gangs active in Colombia at the end of June were Communist, with a total strength of about 1,250 men. Rebeiz also claimed that Communist guerrilla ranks

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had been reduced by more than 50 percent during the first quarter of 1965. In all probability, Rebeiz understated Communist strength and overstated army successes.

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6. Guatemala

In the latest of a series of terrorist actions, guerrillas attacked a United Fruit Company helicopter as it was landing near Bananera in north-eastern Guatemala on 20 July, killing the American pilot and a local employee. The Guatemalan Communists have for some time been threatening to kill US citizens. The latest attack, coming after a guerrilla raid against the customs house in the port town of Matias de Galvez on 14 July-where they stole \$36,000--could presage a renewal of guerrilla activity in the northeast portion of the coun-

try.

7. Honduras

Guerrilla activity in Honduras has been at a standdown since mid-March when Communist-led

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guerrillas unsuccessfully attacked the Rio Lindo hydroelectric plant northeast of Santa Barbara. Guerrilla bands, however, are still believed to be operating in the north coast area and new outbreaks of guerrilla activity are possible at any time.

The Honduran political scene has been relatively stable lately but the recent resignation of the foreign minister--one of two Liberals in the cabinet--could lead to renewed political bickering.

8. Peru

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There have been no known guerrilla attacks by the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) since 27 June. Police units under military command are scouring the area of guerrilla activity but have not made contact with the MIR bands. In Lima, however, government officials remain concerned over the guerrilla threat and Communist activities in general. On 15 July, in his first public condemnation of Communism since coming to office President Belaunde spoke openly against the Communist threat

to Peruvian youth.

There is some evidence that the government may take measures against Communist influence in the universities, specifically by cracking down on student travel to Cuba and other Communist countries. On 10 July minister of government Rotalde spoke out strongly in a press interview deploring the situation whereby university autonomy permits Communist student agitators to organize, proselytize, and take refuge from the law. He has stated privately that he had Belaunde's full support for his strong anti-Communist stand.

9. Venezuela

At least three persons were killed in the extremist violence which erupted in Caracas on 12 July in connection with a Communist-backed transportation strike and continued through the 15th. Tacks


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were strewn in the streets, barricades were set up, and several cars were burned. Terrorist acts also included machine-gunnings, sniper fire, and the throwing of Molotov cocktails. The disturbances were concentrated mostly in the western part of the city, particularly around the Central University campus, a traditional extremist sanctuary and base of operations. Students appeared to be among the chief authors of the violence.

The guerrilla areas were fairly quiet this week. Three men were arrested while attempting to dynamite a bridge in guerrilla-plagued Lara State on 14 July. Meanwhile, on 15 July Havana Radio announced that the FALN guerrilla leadership in Lara State was denouncing the government's "executions" of peasants for collaborating with the guer-

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